The success of Japanese manufacturing firms such as Honda and Toyota has renewed attention to the importance of cost reduction on existing products as a source of productivity growth. Using survey data and interviews, this paper explores the determinants of average-cost reduction for a sample of 207 automotive suppliers in the United States and Canada between 1988 and 1992. In particular, the paper explores the efficacy of methods for mobilizing latent knowledge from decentralized sources such as workers and customers, or "voice". Plants using voice practices did better than other plants if they had a highly effective suggestion program for workers, or if they adopted at least two voice practices, such as a) suggestions from workers and long-term, informationrich relations with customers, or b) suggestions from workers and efficiency wages for workers. Despite this evidence that certain practices may be complementary in their performance, there was little complementarity in adoption. (For example, firms with suggestion systems are slightly less likely to have voice with their customers.) This outcome was attributed to incomplete diffusion of the organizational innovation of 'voice'.
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I. Introduction
In recent decades, Japanese automakers have become known for their low-cost, high-quality products. One source of this success has been their ability to gather ideas from a variety of sources, such as suppliers and workers. For Toyota and Honda, this process has led not just to one-time performance improvements, but to consistent reductions in cost of three to five percent per year over decades. These firms' success at continuous improvement has led them to continue to prosper, despite the weakness of the Japanese economy. (Okano, 1994; Nishiguchi, xx; Smitka,xx) The magnitude of these numbers suggests that much performance improvement at these firms comes from sources other than the highly-specialized scientists and engineers who work in R&D labs separated from the shop floor.
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Beginning in the 1980s, Western manufacturers began to study and adopt some Japanese organizational innovations. This paper investigates the impact of these efforts on cost reduction among auto supplier firms in the US and Canada, using both case-study and quantitative methods. In particular, it looks at the efficacy of adopting a 'voice' method of production, in which firms seek to reduce costs through investments in information-sharing throughout the value chain. For most firms, voice is found to be effective only if at least two complementary practices are adopted.
The issue of complementarity of practices involved in "modern manufacturing" has been examined theoretically by Roberts (1990, 1995) , and empirically by Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997) . The contribution of this paper is to examine a new performance measure (continuing reductions in unit costs on a given product), and to focus on a somewhat different set of practices (mechanisms and incentives for information-sharing both within and between firms).
The next section briefly describes how voice involves changes to traditional production practices. Section 3 describes the survey data used for econometric testing. Section 4 presents a first cut at data analysis, and uses field research to develop hypotheses about the determinants of firms' success at cost reduction. Section 5 presents regression results, and section 6 concludes.
II. Voice and Cost Reduction
The traditional recipe for reducing costs in American business has been for managers and engineers to seek to substitute physical capital for labor, and to maintain arms'-length markets for inputs. In this view, competition leads to reduced costs for three reasons: it motivates existing suppliers of both components and labor to engage in incremental improvement; it motivates existing suppliers to reduce slack in their operations; and it facilitates switching to new suppliers if they are cheaper.
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Critics of this approach argue that automated equipment is only profitable if its high fixed costs can be spread over many identical units, and that therefore companies ignored customer preferences for variety and quality in their quest to "get the metal out the door". In their desire to avoid dependence, firms cut themselves off from valuable sources of new ideas from suppliers of both parts and labor. 3 These critics recommend instead that firms produce in small batches, and establish long-term, information-rich relationships with input providers. In contrast to the argument of Frederick Taylor (1911) that it is most efficient to separate brain work and hand work, the voice approach takes the view that engaging in routine production gives people valuable knowledge about how to improve the process. In this view, suppliers provide both physical inputs for current production and ideas for improving future production (Sabel, 1992; Kenney and Florida, 1993; Adler, xx) . Following Hirschman (1970) , this might be called a "voice" strategy. That is, firms try to improve their operations by communicating with their suppliers of both parts and labor, rather than by threatening to exit from them.
Long-term, information-rich relationships between customers and parts suppliers have been shown to improve performance in areas such as product development productivity and lead time (Clark, 1989; Dyer, 1997) , product quality (Dyer, 1997) , and inventory levels (Lieberman, Helper, and Demeester, 1999) . Similarly, employee involvement leads to increased productivity and quality (MacDuffie, 1995; Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi, 1997) .
However, these relationships also have costs. Supplier suggestions may be based on proprietary information, and achieving the high levels of information flow necessary for a useful discussion about process improvement requires relationship-specific investment by both sides. 4 A supplier will not make such investments without some assurance that it will have the business long enough to earn a reasonable return. For a customer (such as an automaker), these investments greatly increase the cost of switching business partners (Helper and Levine, 1992) .
Parts suppliers have been reluctant to offer commitments to their work forces for the same reasons: such commitments are expensive. Yet without guarantees such as a pledge not to lay off workers due to productivity increases, workers may be unwilling to actively participate in making suggestions for fear that they may make their continued services unnecessary (Parkin, 1996) .
Suggestions may be more effective if they are accompanied by wage policies that give the worker a stake in the firm's performance. (Such policies could take the form of either contingent pay or of an efficiency wage which generates loyalty and/or a cost of job loss.) Finally, a voice relationship 4 Even if the skills are generally applicable ex ante, they may still be what Williamson calls "dedicated assets", which are "discrete additions to generalized capacity which would not be put in place but for the prospect of selling a large amount of product to a particular customer. Premature termination of the contract by the buyer would leave the supplier with a large overhang of capacity that could be disposed of only at distress prices." (1985, p.194) involves much more meeting and training time than does a traditional relationship, since workers must learn and practice problem-solving skills (MacDuffie and Kochan, 1995; Levine, 1995) .
I define "voice" as a set of practices that combines mechanisms for information-sharing and incentives for information-sharing. The central hypothesis of the paper is that a firm that adopts both types of practices will have a smaller change in average costs than will a firm that does not adopt them. The argument is that voice is a method for achieving incremental innovation that leads to downward shifts of a firm's cost curve. Thus, levels of certain practices (such as suggestion systems) promote learning about how to do things better, which leads to changes in costs. I will investigate the impact of voice both between customers and suppliers, and between managers and workers.
III. Data
Field research. I conducted interviews at four firms about their cost reduction efforts.
Below, I use these examples firms to illustrate hypotheses about the determinants of the change in average cost between 1988 and 1992 for a plant's typical product. 5
Questionnaires. In 1993, I conducted two surveys of automotive suppliers. 6 The first survey was sent to the divisional director of marketing at automotive suppliers in the United States and
Canada. This questionnaire asked about relationships with customers, and product characteristics.
The second survey was sent to plant managers, and asked about operations policies and relationships with workers. Each answered the questionnaire for their most important customer regarding one product that was typical of their business unit's output. A questionnaire was sent to every automotive supplier and automaker component division named in the Elm Guide to Automotive Sourcing 5 A common concern about field research is the generalizability of insights gained from looking at just a few cases. For brevity, I present only three cases here. However, the hypotheses also draw on my visits to about 60 firms in the auto industry over the past 12 years, as well as on the academic literature. The analysis in this paper required data from both the plant manager and the marketing director survey; 207 business unit/plant pairs provided these complete data. This subsample does not differ from the full samples on the variables used in the analysis. The respondents had a wealth of experience; they averaged 18 years in the automobile industry and 11 years with their company.
Combining the datasets reduces common measure bias; in particular, worker relationships and customer relationships are measured independently of each other.
The dependent variable is the average annual percent change in cost between 1988 and 1992 to make the product for which they answered the survey. The respondents were asked not to adjust the data for infla tion. To preserve confidentiality, respondents were asked to answer the question within ranges (e.g., did costs fall more than 10%, between 3.1 and 10%, plus or minus 3%, increase 3.1% to 9%, or increase more than 9.1% ?). Data from respondents checking the box marked 'don't know' were omitted, as were missing values.
The dataset contains the following measures of voice policies 7 :
I. Mechanisms for information-sharing with customers:
7 See 
II. Incentives for information-sharing with customers:
CUSTOMER INCENTIVE is one if the supplier in 1988 had a contract with its customer at least two years long, and believed that the customer would help the supplier match a rival's price for a product of equal quality. In the traditional approach, this variable should be positive (since suppliers with long-term contracts know they can get away with a little bit of slack in their operations without losing business.) According to the voice approach, in contrast, good suppliers are made (not born) by creating incentives for relationship-specific investments (Aoki,1990; Helper and Levine, 1992) , so the variable should be negative.
III. Customer Voice
CUSTOMER VOICE is CUSTOMER INFO times CUSTOMER INCENTIVE. By the argument above, it should be zero or positive under the traditional approach. It should be negative in the voice approach.
IV. Mechanisms for information-sharing by workers
SUGGEST, the number of suggestions the plant per worker in 1988.
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V. Incentives for information-sharing by workers
CUTWAGE, the importance in the firm's manufacturing strategy in 1988 of efforts to reduce growth of wages and benefits (measured on a 1 to 5 scale). This variable should be negative for firms using the traditional approach, since reduced wages mean reduced production 8 See below for the results of using other worker information-sharing mechanisms.
costs. In the voice approach, however, the reduction in production costs is offset by the impact of wage-cutting efforts on workers' loyalty, and therefore their interest in making suggestions that reduce costs. RELCOMP, the percentage by which total compensation for the firm's unskilled and semi-skilled production workers exceeds the average for equivalent workers in all industries in the plant's region. 9 The size of a worker's effort at process improvement is costly for management to observe, since if a worker doesn't make a suggestion, it is hard for management to know if that is because there simply was no way to improve the process, or because the worker decided not to work that hard. Receiving higher pay relative to other workers in the area is a powerful incentive to participate, due both to a greater cost of job loss if one is caught shirking, and to loyalty to the firm (Akerlof, 1982) .
NOLAYOFF, a dummy variable measuring whether or not a plant had "made a commitment to our regular work force that no layoffs will result from productivity increases" in 1988. In the traditional approach, this policy should lead to increased costs. In the voice approach, it should lead to reduced costs, by reducing workers' fears that making cost-reducing suggestions will lead to job loss for themselves or their friends.
V. Worker Voice
INTERACTIONS OF SUGGEST WITH CUTWAGE, RELCOMP, AND
NOLAYOFF. To the extent that worker voice is effective, employee suggestions should be more effective if incentives are in place. Therefore, the interaction of SUGGEST with CUTWAGE should be positive; the interaction should be negative with the other two variables.
VI. Interactions of customer and worker voice
If voice policies are complementary, then firms which have voice with their customer will have higher returns to voice with their work force, and vice versa. There are several reasons why one might expect the two types of voice to be more effective if used together (Helper and Levine, 1994) . First, the firms benefit from a long chain of communication: the supplier's workforce can be on the lookout for improvements which are particularly beneficial to the customer. Second is improved implementation of just-in-time production policies: both customer and supplier can reduce inventory more if they share schedule information and believe they can rely on workers to quickly pitch in to fix problems that shut down production. Third is economies of joint implementation. For example, in a case discussed below, Ford was able to transfer its own learning about effective employee involvement to a supplier because of the two companies' voice relationship. On the other had, Ford's training program would not have been so successful in reducing costs had the supplier's workforce not had the skill and inclination to participate.
Joint implementation of customer and worker voice policies is measured by the interaction of customer voice (CUSVOICE) and SUGGEST. 10 If there is complementarity between the policies, this interaction term should be negative.
10 Another approach would have been to interact CUSVOICE with a "worker voice" variable, which would be 1 if a plant had a suggestion system, and paid above-average wages (RELCOMP>0) which it was not trying to cut (CUTWAGE < 4), and 0 otherwise. However, by this measure, only 2 plants had both customer and worker voice. Panel A shows the mean annual average cost reduction for a different combinations of (dichotomized) worker information-sharing mechanisms and incentives-did the plant pay abovemarket wages, and did the plant receive any suggestions from its workers? These policies are complementary, since the sum of the "yes/yes" and "no/no" options yields better performance than the sum of the "yes/no" and "no/yes" options (Athey and Stern, 1997) . The greatest cost reduction was attained by those plants that had both policies (their costs fell by 0.5% per year in nominal terms), followed by those who had neither policy (their costs rose only slightly, by 0.1% per year).
IV. Simple Correlations and Field Research
The number in italics is the number of plants with each policy combination. Each of the four possible combinations is observed with relatively equal frequency, with the highest performing combination being only the third most popular.
Panel B of table 2 shows the same data for voice across different parts of the value chain:
labor information-sharing and customer voice policies 11 . Again, the two policies are complementary;
firms that adopt both achieve cost reductions of 3.6 % per year, better than the sample mean increase in costs of 0.6%.
Table 2 provides evidence that voice policies do lead to more cost reduction, particularly if adopted in combination with each other. Although many objections can be raised against this simple table, it is useful as a guide to intuition. Below, I use four brief case studies to further develop intuition, and then to address econometric issues. The first firm discussed below had no voice policies, and serves as a baseline. The other firms eventually adopted all three of the voice policies discussed in table 2, but adopted the policies in different orders, so they illustrate pitfalls of having different types of non-complementary policies.
Case I: no suggestion system, no efficiency wages, and no voice with customer. Some firms with no voice practices did quite well at cost reduction, largely because they did not incur the incentive costs involved in voice. One such firm made printed circuit boards for the auto industry. This firm brought in consultants to facilitate a comprehensive review of their manufacturing operations. Following a proprietary methodology developed about ten years ago, the consulting firm established a goal of reducing average total cost by 15% over an 18-month period. At the time of my interviews, the project was well on its way to achieving its goal. The key was a change in the way the boards were assembled. In the original process, a short screw was inserted into the board, the board was then turned over, and another short screw was inserted. This process had a cycle time of 24 seconds.
A shift supervisor and some engineers came up with a new method, in which a single long screw was inserted, eliminating the need for flipping the board over. The cycle time was reduced to 18 seconds. This was the bottleneck process, so the output per hour of the entire line also increased by one-fourth. 12 This eliminated the need for a third shift, saving millions of dollars per year. Workers had no involvement in suggesting ideas for improvement; the consultant didn't think they would have had much to contribute.
This case illustrates the benefits of competition in spurring cost reduction.
The effort was spurred by the dissatisfaction of the firm's customer with its high prices. Commitments to employees were seen as inimical to cost reduction. A nolayoff promise would make it difficult to lay off workers freed up by the improvement process, as would paying an above-market wage that would reduce attrition. Also, "A key part of the process is fear", said the consultant who led the cost-reduction project. "Everybody will know which guy didn't make his target. Who do you think will get promoted, and who will get laid off? That fear is key to getting people to stop protecting each other."
Case II: Efficiency wage, then customer voice and suggestion system.
The Industrial Strainer Corporation (ISC) is an 80-employee firm located in Plymouth, Michigan whose main product is an oil separator for the Ford Escort.
Incentives for information-sharing by workers. ISC has paid above-market wages (currently $12 per hour) since a strike in the 1960s shut the firm down for an extended period. The firm also worked very hard to avoid layoffs (there had been only one since 1960), both because the policy helped retain workers, and "because it was the right thing to do", according to the vice-president of manufacturing. These policies led workers to stay a long time (the average operator had worked there for 19.5 years in 1996), and felt loyalty to the company. ("It's a good place to work," explained the shop steward. "You can support your family, and you feel like management--at least some of them--cares about you.") However, until 1994, ISC did not tap into this reservoir of experience and good will to seek organized suggestions from workers.
Incentives and institutions for information sharing with customers.
In the early 1990s, ISC won its first long-term contracts with Ford, and began to become involved in designing the products it manufactured (rather than just building them to Ford's blueprints). As a result of Ford's commitment, ISC bought its first CAD work stations, and began "value analysis" programs with the automaker, where engineers from each firm jointly discussed the contribution to both functionality and cost of each process step. These discussions led to materials substitutions that led to moderate savings on the part.
Institutions for information sharing by workers. In 1994, Ford made a big push to teach its suppliers techniques for continuous improvement. At ISC, the project implementation team was made up of nine employees from different areas of the company (including the chief steward of the UAW local, and the quality engineer). The team spent four days improving the oil separator assembly process under the guidance of Ford engineers, and succeeded in reducing the.number of employees required to do the process from four to three. The main sources of improvement were 1) moving machines into a U-shape so an employee could work on a second machine while waiting for the first to complete its task, 2) better line balance, and 3) installing tables which automatically raised parts to a convenient height, eliminating heavy lifting, and bending over to get parts out of a box. The improvement process cost ISC 36 person-days of effort and 2 lift tables (for a total cost of at most $8000), and yielded savings of one employee for one year (when the part was redesigned)--about $30,000.
Key to the success of the project was the operators' active participation, drawing on the knowledge they gained from doing their normal jobs, and the variety of perspectives within the team. For example, one idea for moving the machines closer together was to turn the line 90 o . However, the forklift driver on the team pointed out immediately that this would partially block an aisle, creating problems for forklift traffic. Had the driver not been there, the engineers would have had to physically move machines to find out that the proposed arrangement was unworkable; maintaining clear pathways was not as salient an issue for them as it was for the forklift driver who had to struggle with cluttered aisles all day. Another operator suggested that one of the workers on the oil separator line had enough idle time to do a job (placing a cap on a grommet) which had been done by an additional
worker. An engineer might have seen this solution, had he been paid to study the problem; the worker learned where the idle time was in the course of working on the line.
The incentive policies which ISC had long had in place gave ISC workers both the incentive and the capability to make useful suggestions 13 , once ISC (with Ford's help) set up mechanisms for collecting and responding to them. Key to the workers' active participation was management's commitment that no one would be laid off as a result of productivity improvement. Even though layoffs had been quite rare in the past, the union shop steward reported that there had been "a lot of fear" in the plant when the idea of continuous improvement was first presented; she had spent a great deal of time obtaining assurances from management and communicating them to her members. This no-layoff policy had a significant short-term cost. In May and June 1996, the Escort oil-separator line ran with three people doing an inspection job that could easily have been handled by one person. The reason was that the firm had just lost a large order for Ford's F-150 truck (the part had been designed out of the new model), and didn't want to lay anyone off. By July, however, other business had picked up, and the extra workers had been moved to other jobs.
Case III. Customer voice, suggestions, and then efficiency wage. An example of a firm in this cell is Company I, a 100-employee plastic injection molder near San Francisco that supplied NUMMI, the GM-Toyota joint venture assembly plant. The plant was started in the late 1980s when NUMMI decided to source some parts locally that had been imported from Japan. The plant had always had a voice relationship with Toyota, from whom it received a lot of technical assistance that allowed it to reduce costs.
The firm had long had a suggestion system for its workers, but found that the suggestions received were not particularly useful. Management blamed this and other problems on the below-market wage (barely over the minimum wage) they paid, which led to a non-English speaking workforce and high (30% per year) turnover, which led to costs above Toyota's targets. 14 As a result of this diagnosis, management in the month before our visit in December 1998 had begun to implement a plan to raise wages 25% over three years. "I think it will reduce turnover and help us to better implement the Toyota Production System," said the company president. "But the only way to find out is to do it."
Case IV: suggestions, incentives for information-sharing from workers, incentives from customer, and then information-sharing from customer. A large Japanese firm built a plant in Battle Creek, Michigan in the early 1980s. The firm brought with it both mechanisms and incentives for information sharing (such as a suggestion system, quality circles (a group of workers who study a problem jointly for several months and then recommend solutions), and a no-layoff policy), and paid market-level wages. However, the scope for continuous improvement from these efforts was very small, due to Japanese automakers' initial strong desire to make sure that the product produced in its US plants was exactly the same as that produced in Japanese plants, to reduce complexity and to assure customers of continuing high quality. Unfortunately, freezing the design meant that the scope for continuous improvement was much reduced. When I visited the supplier firm in 1989, worker suggestions and quality circle activities were limited to those that would improve packaging.
Eventually, however, Japanese automakers gained more confidence, and allowed minor product variations in their US operations.
Econometric objections. Attempts to measure the impact of organizational practices on performance are plagued by several problems. I discuss a number of such issues below.
Is cost reduction an appropriate performance measure? It may be that firms with high cost reduction are the laggards-those who hadn't gotten around to reducing their costs before 1988. In this case, high cost reduction between 1988 and 1992 would be a sign of poor (not excellent) performance. Looking at non-cost performance measures, there is little support for this view. The 21% of the sample that reduced their costs by more than 3% per year (more than 6% in real terms) had more new products than did other firms. They also produced in smaller batches, an indicator correlated with lower inventory costs. There were no significant differences between the top cost reducers and other firms in number of customer awards received, or in R&D spending as a percent of sales. In addition, firms that reduced their costs more than 3% per year between 1988 and 1992 were more likely to have reduced their costs by that much between 1991 and 1992. This figure provides evidence that the top cost reducers were engaged in sustained cost reduction; they hadn't done all of their trimming in one big lump.
On the other hand, firms which had engaged in a systematic improvement process by 1988 had significantly less cost reduction between 1988 and 1992. As discussed below, the explanation for this result could be either that firms that undertook improvement efforts early focussed on objectives other than cost reduction (such as increasing safety or reducing lead time), or that there are diminishing marginal returns to cost reduction efforts. in their effects on performance, there will be economies of joint implementation. In addition, features of the firm's environment or history will also affect the returns to adoption of policies.
If voice policies are so great, why don't all firms have them?
Therefore, researchers should study the adoption and the effectiveness of policies jointly, and be careful to control for factors that could affect the returns to these policies for different groups of firms. In equilibrium, the only firms that have not adopted a set of policies will be those for whom the policies are not cost-effective; what looks like policy effectiveness simply reflects omitted variables that meausure costs of adoption. (Arora and Gambardella (1990) , Milgrom and Roberts (1992) and Athey and Stern (1997) Another possibility is that good managers both adopt voice practices and reduce costs, and that the key to cutting costs is the manager, not the policy. The case examples presented above suggest otherwise, however. In none of the firms that adopted voice policies was the change in policy accompanied by a change in management--but performance did improve. This situation is likely to hold for most of the firms in the dataset as well, since few firms adopted worker voice policies before 1985, while the average plant manager had been with his company since 1982.
15 15 There was no significant difference in tenure either at the company or in the automotive industry between adopters and non-adopters of suggestion systems.
A third possibility is that what appears to be cost reduction due to voice is really cost reduction due to some feature of the firm's history, technology, or economic environment that is correlated with voice adoption. This is clearly true in some cases. For example, Industrial
Strainer's history of paternalistic management increased the effectiveness of its informationsharing programs. Also, it may be that some technologies (such as those with high complexity) offer more opportunity for cost reduction. These possibilities can be reduced (though not eliminated) by the inclusion of controls for such variables, which is done in the next section.
2. Incomplete diffusion. An alternative reason for the lack of complementarity in adoption of policies is that it reflects incomplete diffusion of an organizational innovation. Why firms do not adopt a superior technology as soon as it becomes available is a central question in the literature on technology adoption (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Stoneman, 1983) . One common explanation is a lack of information on the effectiveness of a technology.
Lack of information seems a quite reasonable explanation for this industry in this time. In the 1980s, US firms were just learning about Japanese manufacturing practices, and there were many explanations for the (then-widespread) Japanese success (such as an undervalued yen, low wages, and untransplantable features of Japanese culture) that had little to do with these practices. In addition, voice practices seem counter-intuitive to someone steeped in the traditional US approach to production. Such managers had been taught that it is most efficient to separate brain work (what managers do) from hand work (what workers do), and that ability to lay off workers and suppliers is crucial to controlling costs. Therefore, many managers simply did not believe that the policies worked. When asked why he didn't suggest the implementation of a suggestion system for workers, the consultant to the print circuit board manufacturer said he thought it would be a waste of time. Similarly, from the customers' point of view, "GM needs to have the best technology available at all times--we can't be stuck with a lagging supplier just out of loyalty." 
V. Regression Results
In this section I present the results of multiple regression, including controls for nonvoice determinants of cost reduction. In addition to the voice policies listed in section III, the regressions contain the following variables: is that only about 12 million cars and light trucks were produced in North America in 1992, in 17 Since parts are customized, markets include products with similar functions (e.g., steering wheels for the Ford comparison with 14 million in 1988 (Automotive News, 1995 p.9). Most firms have fairly fixed capacity in the short run, so average cost declines until production is close to peak capacity.
Since most firms were producing at well below peak capacity, it is likely that they were in the declining portion of their average-cost curves.
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INTERACTION OF CHSALES WITH CUSTOMER VOICE AND SUGGEST. If
voice firms are less subject to economies of scale due to their greater flexibility, these variables should enter positively.
PPRICE, the price of the product for which the survey was answered. This variable is highly correlated with complexity; both indicate the scope of things which could be changed to reduce costs, so they should have a negative effect on the change in average cost.
IMPROVE, a dummy variable capturing whether or not the plant had gone through a systematic improvement process involving employees before 1988. If there is an easily capturable lump of cost reduction that is available to the plant only once, then capturing it early makes it unavailable later, so the effect of this variable on the change in average costs between 1988 and 1992 would be positive.
ALUMINUM, a dummy indicating if the product is made of aluminum or not. This variable should enter negatively, both because of a fall in raw aluminum prices over this period and because of the greater technological opportunity for process improvement of working with a material which has been much less studied than steel.
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Escort and steering wheels for the Honda Accord would be part of the same market). 18 This variable is a better measure of the change in scale on a particular product than is change in total revenues for the firm. The reason is that a firm may have one product which is doing very well and another which is doing very poorly. The automakers were consolidating their supplier bases during this period, which explains why the average firm's change in sales for its most important customer (CHSALES) is 14%, even though total industry sales fell. 19 Producer price indexes for aluminum fell an average of 9.6% annually between June 1988 and June 1992; in contrast, they fell only .4% for steel (which is the material used in 52% of the products made by firms in the sample.) Thanks to Barbara Good of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland for the price information.
The following two variables are included so as to have a complete set of materials controls, with no prior expectation as to sign. (The left-out material is steel.)
CERAMICS, a dummy indicating if the product is made of ceramics or glass.
POLYMER, a dummy indicating if the product is made of plastic or rubber.
The following variables are included in some specifications:
JAPAN, a dummy indicating Japanese ownership. This variable captures two (contradictory) factors. One is that Japanese firms had more experience with the voice approach, so they should be able to apply it better, leading to more cost reduction. 20 On the other hand, Japanese management (both at automakers and at the suppliers' parent companies) wanted to make sure that the product produced in its US plants was exactly the same as that produced in Japanese plants, to reduce complexity and to assure customers of continuing high quality.
Unfortunately, freezing the design meant that the scope for continuous improvement was much reduced.
J.CUSTOMER, a dummy indicating Japanese ownership of the firm's most important customer. Again, this variable captures both the greater experience of Japanese firms with the voice approach, and their lesser experience at operating in the US environment.
The model was estimated using the "Grouped Data" procedure in LIMDEP. 21 Looking at column one, we see that none of CUSTOMER INFO, INCENTIVES, or VOICE is significant by itself. However, the interaction of CUSTOMER VOICE with SUGGEST is significant. That is, close relations with the customer lead to cost reduction only if a) a firm has both the information-sharing and incentive components of customer voice, and b) also has information-sharing mechanisms with its workers. In contrast, information-sharing with workers (as measured by SUGGEST) is effective in reducing costs even if not accompanied by efficiency-wage or commitment mechanisms, though suggestions are more effective in the presence of high RELCOMP and low CUTWAGE. However, an efficiency-wage policy (as measured by RELCOMP) is not effective in reducing costs unless there is some mechanism for worker information-sharing.
An increase in sales (CHSALES) leads to reduced unit costs. This reduction is less for firms with suggestion systems, providing support for the hypothesis that firms with worker voice have lower fixed costs. 22 Firms with products which are expensive (high PPRICE) or made out of aluminum (ALUM) also had more cost reduction. Having had a formal improvement process in 1988 or before (IMPROVE) reduces the amount of cost change, suggesting either that there is a part of cost reduction that is characterized by a one-time payoff, or that firms that implemented improvement processes early did not focus on reducing costs.
These results are economically important. The biggest payoff comes for plants that combine suggestions and customer voice; if they have the median number of suggestions among plants that have any suggestions (0.62 per worker), their average costs would fall over 4% per year more than those of firms which don't have both policies, other things equal.
For plants without suggestion systems, a 10% increase in sales leads to a 0.46% decline in costs. 23 Interestingly, variables measuring the intensity of competition were not significant. 24 Perhaps this is because the level of competition was already quite high. (For all firms in the sample, the 22 Perhaps the reason is that firms with suggestion systems had workers that were able to perform a variety of tasks, so they were not idle if sales to a particular customer fell. (Firms with suggestions invested one-third more in training of experienced workers (a median of 16 hours vs 12 hours in 1993) than did other firms.) 23 For the 87 plants with suggestion systems, the decline is more modest, because CHSALES*SUGGEST is positive and significant. A plant with 0.6 suggestions per worker would see a 0.20% decline. 24 Using the number of rival firms in 1988 in addition to or instead of the change in the number of rivals did not produce a significant result.
median pretax profit as percent of sales was only 3.5% in 1992, and 36% had laid off at least 10% of their workers between 1988 and 1992.)
Having just one voice polic y did not typically help a firm reduce costs. The mean average annual change in costs for firms with a suggestion program was higher than for the non-suggestion group (0.9% vs. 0.5%), although the difference was not statistically significant. However, firms which had either a very effective suggestion system or which combined a worker information-sharing policy with either efficiency wages or voice with their customers did significantly better than plants without these mechanisms.
To see this, consider the case of the median plant with a suggestion system, which has a change in costs of 1.1%. It has 0.6 suggestions per worker, pays a RELCOMP of 7.5%, does not have a no-layoff policy, has CUTWAGE=3 (indicating that management believes that slowing wage growth has a moderate importance for the firm's strategy), and has CHSALES=10%. In order to have 95% confidence that the plant is doing better than the mean traditional plant, it would need to have a change in costs of -0.2%, or a net change of -1.3%.
There are several ways to obtain this outcome. If a firm with the median suggestion system adopts customer voice, its costs fall by almost 3% additionally per year (.0481*.62). If the customer won't help, the plant can go it alone. One way is to have an extraordinarily successful suggestion system, one that generates 4 suggestions per worker per year (which would put the plant in the 86 th percentile of plants with suggestion systems). Another way is to implement complementary worker incentive policies. First, note that a wage increase might well pay for itself. Suppose a firm increased its wage premium by eight percentage points. The increased effectiveness of the suggestions received would lead to a change in cost of -0.83%. Because the median plant has only 11% of its total costs due to direct labor, an eight percentage point wage increase would increase the plant's total costs by 0.82%. If the firm combined this wage increase with a suggestion system, it would need only 2 suggestions per worker to match the performance of the traditional strategy.
The no-layoff variable does not behave in accordance with the voice hypothesis, which was that no-layoff policies should increase costs in isolation, but lead to decreased costs when combined with a worker information-sharing mechanism. Instead, a no-layoff policy is found to be particularly costly when combined with suggestions. This result is explored further in column 3 of table 3. This regression omits CUTWAGE, a worker incentive policy which is highly correlated with NO LAYOFF 25 ; in this case, SUGGEST*NO LAYOFF becomes insignificant. 26 This result implies that rather than complementarity, there may be diminishing returns to worker incentive policies.
27
Much of the recent development of "voice" policies has been done by Japanese firms, so it is interesting to look at the impact of Japanese investments in the US and Canadian auto industry. As column 4 of table 3 shows, the coefficients on other variables change very little, indicating that some US-owned firms have successfully adopted voice practices. In fact, Japanese ownership leads to less cost reduction than average, perhaps due to the limited scope for cost reduction available to Japanese-owned firms. However, those plants (both domestically and Japanese-owned) who had a Japanese automaker as their principal customer had more cost reduction, probably due to the extensive investments made by Japanese automakers (particularly Honda and Toyota) to help their suppliers learn continuous improvement techniques.
An important issue is whether a suggestion program is the only employee-involvement practice that promotes cost reduction. Alternatively, a suggestion system may be highly co-linear with other human-resource policy variables (MacDuffie (1995) and Ichniowski, Shaw, and Pennushi (1997; hereafter ISP) . To examine these issues, I constructed measures of each of the participatory human resource practices used in ISP's study of complementarity. 25 The correlation is -0.14; the probability is 0.04. 26 In contrast, SUGGEST*CUTWAGE remains significant when NO LAYOFF is omitted. 27 The regression in table 3 takes the number of suggestions in 1988 as given (because no pre-1988 data is available in the survey). However, having a no layoff policy in 1989 significantly increased the number of suggestions in 1993 (Parkin and Helper, 1995) .
Two measures of labor-management information sharing besides suggestion programs had significant impacts on costs, when used in conjunction with other practices such as efficiency wages or customer voice. (These results were somewhat weaker than were the ones for suggestion systems.)
The policies were a) management 'strongly agreed' that 'Each year we expect our shop workers to make substantial improvements in their own method of operations", and b) the plant had a labormanagement committee which had power over one or more of the following policies in the plant:
work methods and task assignments; changes in product design; purchasing new tools; safety and health policies; subcontracting work to suppliers; and selecting supervisors or team leaders.
Other participative practices studied by ISP were incentive pay; rigorous selection criteria; job flexibility; training, and low-conflict labor relations. None of these factors had a significant direct impact on a plant's cost reduction in this dataset . 28 I also investigated if adopting additional worker information-sharing policies increased cost reduction. That is, did having labor-management committees as well as a suggestion system lead to greater cost reduction? The answer seems to be no--none of the interactions were significant.
VI. Discussion and Conclusions
This paper has found a number of instances in which voice policies appear complementary in effectiveness. Plants which have both worker and customer voice have greater success at cost reduction than do firms with only one of these practices. Similarly, plants with both worker voice and efficiency wages reduced costs more than plants with neither or only one of these practices. Firms with all three elements of customer voice performed better than firms with only one or two--but only if they also had an employee involvement program.
These results are robust to a variety of specifications: with and without controls for production process, material, firm and plant size, capital-labor ratio, and union status.
Even though the analysis in tables 2 and 3 showed that certain practices are complementary in their effectiveness, little complementarity was observed in adoption. However, plants do not show much complementarity in their adoption of these practices. For example, there is no correlation between adoption of worker voice and adoption of an efficiency wage policy, or between adoption of worker voice and customer voice, even though combining these policies was found to increase the return to adopting one of them.
Firms with suggestion systems did not differ from those without such systems by their capital-labor ratio, the nature of the material they used (plastic, rubber, ceramics, aluminum, or steel), the nature of their production process (did it involve forging, casting, extrusion, assembly, etc.), size of firm, wage levels, or willingness to make a no-layoff pledge. 29 In cases where two firms listed the same product, they usually had a variety of practices. For example, of the two firms making fasteners, one had a suggestion system while the other did not.
Of the seven practices studied, the only ones whose adoption was significantly correlated were CUTWAGE with NO LAYOFF and CUTWAGE with CUSTOMER INFO (correlation=0.15; probability=0.027). While the first correlation could be explained as the result of a consistent 'voice' policy toward workers, it is harder to come up with a reason why firms which are trying harder than average to reduce wages should also be more likely to provide process information to customers. 28 However, there may be an indirect impact, which works through the number of suggestions. Parkin and Helper (1995) found that training and incentive pay in 1989 affected suggestions in 1992. Also, the measure available of selection criteria was quite crude. 29 In a correlation matrix of 21 product controls and 7 practices, only the following 4 correlations were significant at better than the 5 % level: firms which did welding received more suggestions than average and were less likely to try to cut wages; firms making ceramic products had more voice with their customer, and firms with aluminum products were more likely to have a no-layoff policy.
Firms with and without suggestions do differ on a number of variables, some of which have to do with mutual dependence between the firm and its workers 30 . Firms with suggestion programs are significantly more likely to "strongly agree" that "Each year we expect our shop workers to make substantial improvements in their own method of operations", and to have lower employee turnover (4.7% vs. 8% per year). As mentioned above, they invest one-third more in formal training of experienced workers. Even though the suggestion plants are larger (a median 218 employees vs.
150), the ratio of workers to supervisors is higher (21 vs. 16). In general, the nature of a firm's product or process technology did not affect its observed degree of participation with workers, or with its customer.
As discussed in the previous section, one reason that complementarity in adoption is not more closely correlated with complementarity in effectiveness may be that firms in 1988 simply didn't know about these results. A firm's learning process is complicated by the fact that (at least according to the results presented here) a firm must adopt a cluster of new policies to do better than the traditional strategy: in order to outperform a firm adopting none of the policies, managers must either implement a very prolific suggestion system, or adopt at least two "voice" 
TABLE 1. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Dependent Variable
CHCOST Change in average cost 1988-92 for the "typical" product for which the respondent chose to answer the survey. 1= costs fell more than 10%, 2= fell between 3.1 and 10%, 3= plus or minus 3%, 4=increase 3.1% to 9%, 5= increase more than 9.1% 
Independent Variables
RELCOMP
Percentage by which pay of unskilled and semiskilled production workers exceeds that for equivalent workers in all industries in the plant's geographic area, 1992 NOLAYOFF = 1 if management has made a commitment to the regular work force that no layoffs will result from productivity increases, 1988;=0 otherwise
Controls for economic environment and technological opportunity
CHRIVAL is the change in "the number of firms potentially able to supply the same product (without major investment)" between 1988 and 1992.
CHSALES
Change in sales to most important customer, 1988-92. 1 = decrease more than 30%, 2 = decrease 15-30%, 3 = decrease 6-14%, 4=+/-5%, 5= increase 6-15%, 6= increase 15-30%, and 7=increase more than 30%.
IMPROVE=1 if plant had completed formal improvement process by 1988, =0 otherwise. 
